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ACCELERATING THE ENTRY INTO
FORCE OF THE CTBT: NOW IS THE TIME
Statement
by Representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations to the
Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
CTBT
September 25, 2009
Distinguished delegates,
The history of the nuclear age makes clear that opportunities to
reduce the grave dangers posed by nuclear weapons are often fleeting.
When the right political conditions are in place, government leaders
must seize the chance to make progress.
NOW IS SUCH A TIME:
Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
is within sight. Since the idea of a ban on nuclear testing was first
proposed in the 1950s, it has stood among the highest priorities on
the international nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. As U.S.
President Barack Obama noted in April of this year, the CTBT is a
concrete step toward “a world without nuclear weapons.”
THE CTBT IS MORE IMPORTANT NOW THAN EVER.
The CTBT has near-universal support: 181 nations have signed and 150
have ratified the Treaty. Last fall, the UN General Assembly voted
175-1 in favor of a resolution on the CTBT—and we expect the one “no”
vote by the United States will become a “yes” vote this year.
We applaud those states that have lined up to express their support of
the Treaty at this Conference. We recognize those states that made
their full financial contribution to the build-up and operation of the
Treaty’s international monitoring and verification system. But
rhetoric alone is not enough to make the entry into force of the CTBT
a reality. Article XIV of the Treaty provides that in order to enter
into force, ratification is needed from a number of key players. Nine
necessary states have failed to ratify the CTBT and are therefore
delaying its entry into force.
To help put the CTBT over the finish line, we also strongly urge that
like-minded pro-CTBT states work together to develop and execute a
common diplomatic strategy to persuade the remaining states to sign
and/or ratify the treaty before the next Article XIV Conference two
years from now. Failure to pursue such an effort will cast doubt on
the sincerity of the many strong statements of support for CTBT entry
into force expressed at this conference.
We also strongly encourage those few states that have not delivered
their assessed contribution or that do not yet allow the transmittal
of data from monitoring stations on their territory to do so without
further delay. Such actions are contrary to the goals of the Treaty.
THE VALUE OF THE CTBT
By banning all nuclear weapon test explosions, including so-called
hydro nuclear explosions, the CTBT limits the ability of established
nuclear-weapon states to field more sophisticated warheads. Without
the option of nuclear explosive testing, it is far more difficult for
newer members of the club to perfect smaller, more easily deliverable
warheads.
For these and other reasons, CTBT ratification has long been
considered essential to the fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT and
the goal of “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” The CTBT also
serves to reinforce the nonproliferation system by serving as a
confidence-building measure about a state’s nuclear intentions and, in
this regard, it can help head-off and de-escalate regional tensions.
With the CTBT in force, global and national capabilities to detect and
deter possible clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be
significantly greater. Entry-into-force is essential to making
short-notice, on-site inspections possible and maintaining long-term
political and financial support from other nations for the operation
of the International Monitoring System and International Data Center.
ACCELERATING ENTRY INTO FORCE
Ratification by the United States and China is particularly important.
Given their existing nuclear test moratoria and 1996 signature of the
CTBT, Washington and Beijing already bear most CTBT-related
responsibilities, yet their failure to ratify has denied them—and
others—the full security benefits of CTBT entry into force.
The United States is poised to be a leader on the CTBT once again.
We applaud President Barack Obama’s April 5 statement in Prague in
which he said: "To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my
administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S.
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than
five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons
to finally be banned."
Now, President Obama must translate those words into action by
mounting a substantial effort to win the support of two-thirds of the
U.S. Senate for the treaty. With the support of a wide array of NGOs
in the United States and around the globe the President must convince
the Senate that the Treaty enhances U.S.
security, is effectively verifiable, and would not compromise future
efforts to maintain the reliability, safety, or security of the United
States’ existing stockpile of nuclear warheads.
Technical advances in each of these areas over the past decade should
make the case for the CTBT even stronger than it was in 1999 when the
Senate failed to provide its advice and consent for ratification.
For years, Chinese government representatives have reported that the
CTBT is before the National People’s Congress for consideration but
has apparently taken no action to win legislative approval needed for
ratification.
Washington’s renewed pursuit of CTBT ratification opens up
opportunities for China and other Annex II states—such as Indonesia—to
lead the way toward entry into force by ratifying before the United
States does. Action by Beijing would increase its credibility as a
non-proliferation leader and improve the chances that other states in
Asia, as well as the United States, would follow suit.
We note the June 8 statement by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Hassan
Wirajuda: “We share [President Obama’s] vision of a world in which
nuclear weapons have been eradicated. We trust that he will succeed in
getting the CTBT ratified—and we promise that when that happens,
Indonesia will immediately follow suit.” Indeed, ratification by
Indonesia would enhance its reputation as a world leader and agent for
international security.
India and Pakistan could advance the cause of nuclear disarmament and
substantially ease regional tensions by converting their unilateral
test moratoria into a legally-binding commitment to end nuclear
testing through the CTBT.
Eleven years ago this week, then-Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee told the 53rd UN General Assembly that India would not be
among the last states standing in the way of the treaty's entry into
force. Unfortunately, over the past decade, neither India nor Pakistan
have transformed their de facto nuclear test moratorium into a
legally-binding commitment not to conduct nuclear test explosions. It
is past time for India’s current leaders to take up Prime Minister
Vajpayee's promise to the General Assembly and move toward joining the
near-consensus on the CTBT.
Last month, India’s National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan said in
an interview: “As of now, we are steadfast in our commitment to the
moratorium. At least there is no debate in the internal circles about
this.”
Asked if India would have no problem signing the treaty if the others
whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force —
especially the U.S. and China — did so, Mr. Narayanan responded: “I
think we need to now have a full-fledged discussion on the CTBT.”
Mr. Narayanan’s statement is encouraging. But we cannot afford to
simply hope and wait. Leading states have a responsibility to work
much harder to encourage India and Pakistan to meet the same
nonproliferation and disarmament standards expected of other states,
including ratification of the CTBT.
With no shortage of conflict and hostility in the Middle East,
ratification by Israel, Egypt and Iran would reduce
nuclear-weapons-related security concerns in the region. It would also
help create the conditions necessary for the realization of a zone
free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the
Middle East, as called for in the Middle East Resolution adopted by
the 1995 NPT Review Conference.
Likewise, if Israel were to ratify the CTBT, it would bring that
nation closer to the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream and help
encourage other states in the region to do so. Iranian ratification
would help reduce concerns that its nuclear program could be used to
develop and deploy deliverable nuclear warheads. Continued failure by
Iran to ratify the CTBT raises further questions about the nature of
its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
The decision of the government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of
North Korea (DPRK) to suspend its participation in the Six-Party
Denuclearization process is deeply disappointing. We sincerely urge
the DPRK to refrain from further nuclear testing and we urge the
effective and rapid implementation of the commitments made pursuant to
the Six-Party agreements by all involved as a step toward mutual
security, as well as CTBT entry into force.
REINFORCING THE CTBT
To reinforce their commitment to the purpose and objectives of the
CTBT, we also call upon all nuclear-armed nations to adopt clear
policies neither to develop or produce new design warheads nor to
modify existing warhead types for the purpose of creating new military
capabilities.
President Obama has already stated on the White House Web site in
January that he “will stop the development of new nuclear weapons.”
Indeed, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been—and can continue to
be—maintained with high confidence through non-nuclear tests and
evaluations, and as necessary, the remanufacture of key components to
previous design specifications. Independent technical experts have
determined that the United States can maintain its existing arsenal
through a conservative program of warhead refurbishment rather than
through new design “replacement” warheads. We strongly urge the Obama
administration to embed such a “no new nuclear warheads” policy in its
forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review.
To increase confidence in their commitment to the CTBT, we also urge
nuclear-armed states to seriously consider joining France in closing
their test sites to all nuclear weapons-related research activities
and experiments, particularly those involving fissile material. In the
meantime, we encourage states with active nuclear test sites to adopt
transparency and confidence building measures that help clarify that
there are no prohibited nuclear test explosion activities of any kind
on their territory.
CTBT entry into force is within reach. The next two years may
represent the best opportunity to secure the future of this
long-awaited and much-needed treaty. We urge you to act now and to act
with boldness.
Thank you.
This statement was coordinated by the Arms Control Association,
delivered by Jessica Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and has been endorsed by the following
individuals and organizations:
Irma Arguello, Chair, Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation
(Argentina)
Hideyuki Ban, Co-director, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
(Japan)
Barry M. Blechman, Distinguished Fellow, Henry L. Stimson Center
(U.S.A.)
Jay Coghlan, Executive Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico (U.S.A.)
Dr. Khalid Aftab Sulehri-President International Human Rights
Observer(IHRO) Pakistan
David Culp, Legislative Director, Friends Committee on National
Legislation (U.S.A.)
Glenn Carroll, Coordinator, Nuclear Watch South (Atlanta, GA, U.S.A.)
Nicola Cufaro Petroni, Secretary General, Union of Scientists for
Disarmament (Italy)
Dr. Ian Davis, Director, NATO Watch (United Kingdom)
Marie Dennis, Director, Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns (U.S.A.)
Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament
Affairs
Trevor Findlay, William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International
Affairs,
Director,
Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
,
and Professor,
Carleton
University, (Canada)
Bill Goodfellow, Executive Director, Center for International Policy
(U.S.A.)
Susan Gordon, Executive Direction, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
(U.S.A.)
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., Acting Director, United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, 1993 (U.S.A.)
Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute (U.S.A.)
Ambassador Robert Grey, former U.S. Rep. to the Conference on
Disarmament (U.S.A.)
Xanthe Hall, Programme Coordinator, International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War (Germany)
John Hallam, Coordinator, Nuclear Flashpoints (Australia)
David Hafemeister, Research Affiliate, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University (U.S.A.)
Morton Halperin, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State
1996-2001 (U.S.A.)
Mark Harrison, Director, Peace with Justice Program, United Methodist
General Board of Church and Society (U.S.A.)
Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British-American Security Information
Council (U.K.-U.S.A.)
John Isaacs, Executive Director, Center for Arms Control and
Nonproliferation (U.S.A.)
Dr. Rebecca Johnson, Founding Director, Acronym Institute for
Disarmament Diplomacy (U.K.)
Marylia Kelley, Executive Director, Tri-Valley CAREs (U.S.A.)
Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
(U.S.A.)
Don Kraus, Chief Executive Officer, Citizens for Global Solutions
(U.S.A.)
David Krieger, President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (U.S.A.)
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation
Initiative, New America Foundation (U.S.A.)
Jessica Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(U.S.A.)*
Christopher Paine, Nuclear Program Director, Natural Resources Defense
Council (U.S.A.)
Andreas Persbo, Acting Executive Director, Verification, Research,
Training and Information Centre (U.K.)
Larry Pullen, Advocacy Director, Faithful Security: the National
Religious Partnership on the Nuclear Weapons Danger (U.S.A.)
Jon Rainwater, Executive Director, Peace Action West (U.S.A.)
Ambassador Henrik Salander, Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Susi Snyder, Secretary General, Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom
Vappu Taipale, M.D., Co-President, International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War
Paul F. Walker, Director, Security and Sustainability, Global Green
USA (U.S.A.)
Peter Wilk, MD, Executive Director, Physicians for Social
Responsibility (U.S.A.)
Stephen Young, Washington Representative, Global Security Program,
Union of Concerned Scientists (U.S.A.)
*Institution listed for identification purposes only. |
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